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Abstract	  
The	  following	  study	  analyses	  the	  academic	  background	  and	  careers	  of	  175	  members	  
of	   Governments	   and	   Central	   Banks	   of	   seven	   countries	   (Belgium,	   Brazil,	   France,	  
Germany,	  Greece,	  Spain	  and	  United	  Kingdom)	  for	  the	  years	  1975	  and	  2015,	  in	  order	  
to	  verify	  whether	  the	  “Revolving	  Door	  Theory”	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  these	  cases.	  
After	   some	   research	   on	   the	   curricula	   vitae	   of	   the	   members	   of	   Governments	   and	  
Central	  Banks,	  we	  found	  that,	  for	  instance,	  that	  more	  Government	  and	  Central	  Bank	  
members	  studied	  abroad	  for	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  than	  for	  the	  other	  countries.	  
We	  also	  found	  that	  it	  is	  more	  common	  for	  Central	  Bank	  executive	  members	  to	  obtain	  
PhDs	  than	  it	  is	  the	  case	  for	  Government	  members.	  Moreover,	  external	  promotions	  in	  
the	   Central	   Banks	   in	   1975	   were	   quite	   relevant	   but	   no	   cases	   were	   registered	   for	  
2015;	  for	  Governments,	  the	  trend	  was	  the	  exact	  opposite,	  no	  external	  promotions	  in	  
1975	  but	  many	  cases	  in	  2015.	  
While	   it	   is	   not	  possible	   to	   find	   irrefutable	   evidence	   to	   sustain	   the	  Revolving	  Door	  
hypothesis,	   it	   is	   still	   possible	   to	   find	   recurrent	  patterns	   in	  different	   countries	   that	  
may	  be	  explained	  by	  that	  theory.	  More	  expanded	  databases	  and	  a	  larger	  selection	  of	  
countries	  is	  required	  for	  that	  analysis.	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1	  This	  working	  paper	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  investigation	  developed	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  
the	  discipline	  of	  Cycles	  and	  Economic	  Crises,	  3rd	  year	  of	  graduation,	  under	  the	  
supervision	  of	  Professor	  Francisco	  Louçã.	  




The	  relationship	  between	  Politics	  and	  Business	  has	  become	  an	  interesting	  research	  
topic	  for	  Political	  Science	  and	  Economics,	  and	  more	  recently,	  for	  Management.	  This	  
interest	  and	   the	  studies	   that	   followed	  gave	  rise	   to	  a	  new	  concept	   in	   the	   literature,	  
yet	  to	  be	  more	  rigorously	  defined:	  political	  connectedness.	  So,	  political	  connections,	  
lato	   sensu,	   regard	   the	   relationship	   between	   political	   power	   (in	   the	   form	   of	   its	  
representatives)	  and	   industry	   (once	  again	   in	   the	   form	  of	   its	  decision	  makers);	   the	  
idea	  is	  that	  the	  agents	  that	  act	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  one	  and	  another	  may	  be	  one	  and	  the	  
same	  –	  perhaps	  just	  interchanging	  positions.	  
This	  is	  a	  relevant	  matter	  since	  the	  public	  interest	  is	  at	  stake;	  having	  the	  same	  people	  
controlling	  both	  the	  political	  and	  the	  industrial	  spheres	  may	  generate	  some	  conflicts	  
of	  interests	  that	  compromise	  their	  commitment	  either	  to	  one	  or	  the	  other.	  	  	  	  	  
Our	  study	  gathers	   information	  about	  the	  academic	  record	  and	  professional	  career,	  
before	   and	   after	   the	   respective	   mandates,	   of	   members	   of	   governments	   and/or	  
governing	  bodies	  of	  central	  banks	  of	  Brazil,	  France,	  Spain,	  Belgium,	  Germany,	  Greece	  
and	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  the	  years	  1975	  and	  2015.	  
Our	  aim	  is	  to	  find	  some	  patterns,	  for	  instance,	  if	  there	  is	  some	  predominance	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  education,	  type	  of	  degree,	  country	  elected	  to	  study	  abroad	  (if	  that	  is	  case).	  
Our	  questions	   also	   regard	   the	   jobs	  performed	  by	   the	  politicians	   and	  Central	  Bank	  
directors	   before	   and	   after	   their	   mandates	   and	   if	   that	   had	   any	   impact	   on	   their	  
professional	   careers	   or	   if	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   find	   a	   pattern	   when	   comparing	   their	  
academic	  and/or	  professional	  background.	  
Hence,	  to	  the	  present	  analysis,	  we	  will	  try	  to	  identify	  some	  relevant	  patterns	  in	  the	  
public	  x	  private	  through	  the	  analysis	  of:	  
1.	   	   	  Education:	  Level	  of	  education	  (PhD	  or	  not),	  degree	  of	  internationalization	  (Abroad	  
or	  not)	  and	  degree	  of	  homogeneity	  (preponderance	  of	  any	  country/school	  in	  terms	  
of	  the	  distribution	  of	  PhDs)	  
2.	  	  	  	  Career:	   previous/after	   career,	   identifying	   from	   where	   public	   servers	   (both	   from	  
governments	   and	   Central	   Banks)	   have	   come	   (private/public	   sectors,	   international	  
institutions,	  academic	  universe)	  and	  to	  where	  they	  went	  after	  their	  services.	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3.	  	  	  	  Promotions:	  the	  presence	  of	  internal	  promotions	  (members	  of	  governing	  bodies	  of	  
Central	   Banks	   who	   came	   from	   the	   CB	   itself,	   number	   of	   those	   remaining	   at	   the	  
Central	  Bank	  after	  a	  governing	  role,	  number	  of	  members	  of	  governments	  who	  came	  
from	  public	  institutions,	  number	  of	  those	  members	  of	  government	  coming	  from	  the	  
public	   sector	   and	   being	   transferred	   to	   private	   administrations	   of	   firms,	   namely	  
financial)	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   external	   promotions	   (number	   of	   those	   being	  
transferred	  to	  private	  sector	  namely	  financial	  firms	  after	  a	  role	  at	  the	  Central	  Bank	  
or	  government).	  	  
Although	  some	  comparisons	  and	  patterns	  are	  established,	  we	  consider	  the	  different	  
stages	  of	  development	  of	  the	  countries.	  The	  degree	  of	  development	  of	  the	  countries	  
differs	  according	  not	  only	  to	  time	  but	  also	  historical,	  geographical	  –	  and	  geopolitical	  
–	  situations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Data	   for	  2015	  was	  much	  easier	   to	   find	   than	   for	  1975.	  Limited	   time	  and	  resources	  
prevented	   a	   more	   thorough	   research,	   although	   all	   efforts	   were	   done	   in	   order	   to	  
gather	  as	  much	  information	  as	  possible.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  database	  from	  which	  we	  
were	   able	   to	   draw	   some	   interesting	   connections.	   Still,	   as	   in	   any	   other	   academic	  
research,	   questions	   keep	   coming	   at	   a	   higher	   speed	   than	   answers;	   in	   our	  
understanding,	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  research	  yet	  to	  be	  done.	  	  	  
	  
2.	  Survey	  
In	   this	   section	   some	  of	   the	   literature	   that	   relates	   to	  our	  present	   analysis	   is	  
presented.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  investigation	  on	  the	  topic,	  
politically	   connected	   firms	   and	   the	   relationship	   between	   public	   power	   and	   market	  
engagement,	  we	  will	   present	   here	   the	  main	   aspects	   of	   eight	   publications	   that	   are	  
related	  to	  the	  pith	  of	  our	  work	  and	  that	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  will	  guide	  our	  exercise.	  
	   Louçã,	  Lopes	  and	  Costa	  (2014)	  investigate,	  in	  their	  chapter	  6,	  “To	  the	  infinity	  
and	  beyond:	   Politics	   in	   the	   path	   of	   business,”	   the	   complicity	   between	  politics	   and	  
business	   in	  Portugal	   through	  a	   large	  population	  of	  members	  of	  Governments.	  The	  
authors	   investigated	   every	   member	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   constitutional	   government	  
until	   the	   year	   2013,	   using	   public	   information.	   They	   searched	   for	   several	   kinds	   of	  
information	   including:	   education	   and	   academic	   profile,	   where	   they	   started	   their	  
professional	   career	   (private	   companies,	   public	   offices,	   political	   career),	   links	   to	  
major	  law	  firms,	  all	  was	  analyzed	  and	  studied	  in	  detail,	   in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  
Portuguese	  society	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  governments	  are	  formed	  in	  Portugal	  and	  the	  
necessary	   influences	   to	   climb	   the	   career	   ladder.	   They	   found,	   as	   a	   result,	   that	   776	  
members	  of	  government	  have	  occupied	  1281	  official	  positions	  and	   that	  415	  other	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members,	   about	   60%,	   had	   served	   as	   well	   as	   managers	   or	   directors,	   or	   another	  
leading	   capacity,	   in	   private	   companies,	   namely	   of	   the	  main	   economic	   groups.	   The	  
authors,	  with	  this	  investigation,	  clearly	  identified	  two	  social	  processes.	  The	  first	  was	  
that	   recruitment	   of	   ministers	   and	   secretaries	   of	   state	   is	   done	   regularly	   in	   major	  
companies	  and	  economic	  groups	  of	  the	  country,	  where	  top	  managers	  are	  selected	  to	  
join	   the	   government.	   The	   second	   was	   that	   the	   having	   an	   official	   position	   in	  
government	   favors	   a	   future	   promotion,	   namely	   in	   large	   companies	   and	   economic	  
groups,	   and	   in	   many	   cases,	   it	   leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   stakeholders	   are	  
frequently	  connected	  and	  present	   in	   the	  main	  mechanisms	  of	  power.	  A	  passage	   in	  
the	   government	   is	   seen	   only	   as	   a	   launching	   pad	   for	   social	   and	   economic	   power:	  
there	   are	   more	   members	   of	   government	   moving	   to	   the	   business	   world	   than	  
otherwise.	   The	   authors	   also	   highlighted	   the	   link	   between	   the	   administration	   of	  
Portuguese	   companies	   and	   national	   policy,	   including	   the	   three	  major	   parties	   (PS,	  
PSD,	  CDS)	  proving	   that	   it	   is	  a	  route	   to	  success,	   to	   the	  rise	  of	   the	  career	  and	  to	   the	  
power	  of	   the	   rulers.	  This	   seems	   to	  be	  a	   clearly	  evident	   routine,	  proved	  by	  several	  
examples.	  This	   connection	  not	  only	  brings	  personal	  benefits,	  but	  also	  protects	   the	  
company	  and	  its	  market	  power	  over	  the	  political	  contingencies.	  So	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  
rulers	  who	  occupy	  more	  positions	  and	  for	  longer	  in	  the	  government	  are	  studied	  in	  
much	  detail.	   They	   concluded	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   governments,	   political	  
parties	  and	  the	  large	  economic	  groups	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  unit	  which	  concentrates	  all	  
kinds	  of	  power	  and	  that	  all	  these	  connections	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  a	  ball	  of	  yarn	  that	  
does	  not	  fall	  apart,	  in	  other	  words,	  being	  a	  Minister	  and	  a	  Secretary	  of	  State	  makes	  
the	  difference.	  
Some	  of	  these	  results	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  1.	  
Table	  1:	  Type	  of	  connections	  of	  government	  members	  
Firms/Members	  of	  govt.	   Number	   of	   cabinet	   members	  
(%)	  
Posts	  they	  occupied	  (%)	  
In	  large	  economic	  groups	   170	  (22,9%)	   311	  (24,3%	  
In	  the	  financial	  sector	   230	  (29,6%)	   382	  (29,8%)	  
In	  industry	   193	  (24,9%)	   187	  (14,6%)	  
In	  real	  estate	  and	  building	  
firms	  
94	  (12,1%)	   173	  (13,5%)	  
In	  communications	  firms	   95	  (12,2%)	   159	  (12,4%)	  
Promotion	  (were	  not	  and	  
became	  connected)	  
187	  (24,1%)	   337	  (26,3%)	  
Veterans	  (were	  connected	  
and	  returned	  to	  business	  
after	  gov.)	  
143	  (18,4%)	   354	  (27,6%)	  
Source:	  Louçã	  et	  al.	  (2014)	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For	  the	  case	  of	  Portugal,	  a	  high	  level	  of	  connections	  was	  found:	  approximately	  one	  in	  
three	   members	   of	   government	   either	   came	   or	   went	   to	   the	   administration	   of	   a	  
financial	  firm,	  one	  in	  five	  did	  so	  to	  the	  largest	  stock	  market	  firms	  and	  one	  in	  four	  in	  
the	  larger	  economic	  groups.	  
	   Niessen	   and	   Ruenzi	   (2009)	   aimed	   to	   investigate	   the	   politically	   connected	  
companies	  in	  Germany	  between	  2006	  and	  2007.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  
institutions	  politically	  connected,	  the	  authors	  also	  investigated,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  
characteristics	   of	   Bundestag	   members	   engaged	   in	   non-­‐parliamentary	   activities,	  
compared	   with	   the	   members	   of	   parliament	   (MP)	   with	   no	   such	   involvement.	   The	  
authors	  collected	  data	  from	  non-­‐parliamentary	  job	  activities	  of	  611	  members	  of	  the	  
Bundestag,	  based	  on	  the	  information	  available	  at	  the	  Bundestag´s	  website.	   	  From	  a	  
sample	   containing	   605	   companies,	   they	   found	   that	   28	   (4,6%)	   were	   politically	  
connected	   through	   the	  employment	  of	  a	  MP.	  Even	   though	   there	  were	  several	  MPs	  
associated	   to	   small	   firms,	   the	   research	   only	   included	  publicly	   traded	   companies	   –	  
the	   ones	   whose	   financial	   market	   data	   was	   accessible.	   Most	   of	   the	   politically	  
connected	   firms	   were	   well-­‐established	   and	   well-­‐known	   not	   only	   in	   German	   but	  
worldwide;	  for	  instance,	  the	  firms	  with	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  delegates,	  four	  and	  three,	  
were	   Allianz	   AG	   and	   Deutsche	   Bank	   AG,	   respectively.	   Political	   links	   were	   more	  
evident	   among	   the	   following	   industries:	   financial	   institutions,	   insurance,	   stock	  
exchange,	   energy	   and	   automobile.	   Some	   of	   the	   MPs	   had	   connections	   with	   firms	  
whose	   activity	   is	   related	   to	   their	   official	   roles;	   for	   instance,	   some	   MPs	   who	   are	  
members	   of	   the	   Bundestag’s	   Finance	   Committee	  work	   for	   companies	   like	   Allianz,	  
Deutsche	   Bank,	   Deutsche	   Börse,	   and	   Commerzbank.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  MPs	  who	  
were	   members	   of	   the	   Committee	   on	   Educational,	   Research,	   and	   Technology	  
Assessment	   worked	   for	   firms	   within	   the	   Energy	   or	   the	   Pharmaceutical	   Industry.	  
There	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  some	  of	  these	  cases	  represented	  conflicts	  of	  interests;	  or	  it	  
may	  simply	  disclose	  the	  MPs’	  expertise.	  According	  to	  the	  data,	  the	  right	  wing	  of	  the	  
Parliament	   (the	   Conservative	   party,	   CDU/CSU,	   and	   the	   Liberal	   party,	   FDP)	   were	  
more	  likely	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  firms	  than	  the	  left	  wing.	  Overall,	  76%	  of	  all	  connected	  
MPs	  were	  members	  of	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  Government.	  Another	  finding	  of	  this	  
research	   was	   that	   politically	   connected	   firms	   had	   higher	   market	   capitalization,	  
higher	  sales	  and	  higher	  total	  assets	  than	  the	  ones	  with	  no	  connections.	  The	  standard	  
deviations	   for	   stock	   market	   return	   were	   quite	   different	   for	   politically	   connected	  
firms	  and	  politically	  unconnected	   firms;	   the	   first	   (23%)	   is	  almost	  half	   the	  value	  of	  
the	  second	  ones	  (48%).	  From	  this	   information,	  we	  can	  understand	  that	  politicians	  
worked	  mainly	   for	   large,	   well	   established	   and	   low	   risk	   companies,	   eventually	   for	  
reputational	   reasons.	   These	   assumptions	   were	   supported	   by	   the	   low	   average	   of	  
Tobin’s	   Q	   of	   connected	   firms	   –	   which	   means	   that	   there	   were	   very	   few	   growth	  
opportunities	  for	  these	  firms	  –	  and	  by	  the	  lower	  price-­‐earnings	  ratios	  of	  politically	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connected	   firms	   when	   compared	   to	   politically	   unconnected	   firms.	   In	   terms	   of	  
performance,	   both	   ROE	   and	   ROI	   showed	   higher	   results	   for	   politically	   connected	  
firms.	   Overall,	   German	   firms	   with	   political	   connections	   delivered	   a	   better	  
performance,	  had	  better	  accounting	   indicators	  of	  performance	   (ROE	  and	  ROI)	  and	  
also	   earned	   positive	   abnormal	   returns.	   By	   comparing	   2006	   results	   (no	   political	  
connections	  publicly	  available)	   to	  2007	  results	   (after	   the	  enactment	  of	   the	  Law	  of	  
Transparency),	   the	   authors	   noticed	   that	   performance	   differences	   decreased	   and	  
became	  almost	  non-­‐significant.	  The	  authors	  also	  conclude	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  establish	  a	  causality	  relationship	  between	  political	  connections	  
and	   firm	   performance	   there	   are	   positive	   correlations	   between	   the	   two.	   So,	   either	  
MPs	  help	  firms	  having	  better	  performances	  or	  MPs	  are	  able	  to	  select	  those	  firms	  as	  
employers	  perform	  well.	  
	   Bertrand,	   Kramarz	   and	   Schoar	   (2004)	   analyzed	   the	   networks	   between	  
political	   leaders	   and	   CEOs	   of	   some	   public-­‐traded	   companies	   in	   France,	   between	  
1989	  and	  2002.	  While	  previous	  researches	  focused	  on	  the	  advantages	  firms	  can	  get	  
from	  having	  connections	  to	  politicians,	  this	  paper	  focused	  on	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  
It	   is	   investigated	   whether	   CEOs	   of	   publicly-­‐traded	   companies	   that	   have,	   through	  
their	   educational	   and	   professional	   background,	   relations	   to	   the	   political	   elite	   are	  
willing	   to	  provide	   “economic	   favors”	   on	  politicians	   to	  help	   them	   to	   get	   re-­‐elected.	  
Between	   the	   conclusions	  mentioned	   in	   this	  work	  we	   can	   highlight	   three:	   i)	   lower	  
rates	  of	  return	  by	  the	  companies	  managed	  by	  connected-­‐CEOs,	   ii)	  connected	  CEOs	  
create	  more	  jobs	  in	  election	  years	  (and	  around	  election	  years)	  than	  the	  others,	  the	  
opposite	  happens	  with	  plant	  closures	  or	  layoffs,	  iii)	  there	  is	  limited	  evidence	  for	  the	  
importance	   of	   the	   connections	   of	   CEOs	   and	   politicians	   based	   on	   the	   political	   and	  
educational	  backgrounds.	  
Faccio	   (2006),	   for	   a	   sample	   of	   42	   countries,	   examined	   firms	   whose	  
controlling	  shareholders	  and	  top	  managers	  are	  member	  of	  national	  parliaments	  or	  
governments.	  The	  author	  defines	  a	  company	  as	  politically	  connected	  if	  (at	  least)	  one	  
of	   the	   company´s	   large	   shareholders	   (anybody	  directly	  or	   indirectly	   controlling	   at	  
least	  10%	  of	  votes)	  or	  top	  directors	  (the	  CEO,	  president,	  vice-­‐president	  or	  secretary)	  
is	   a	   member	   of	   the	   parliament,	   a	   minister	   (including	   the	   Prime	  Minister),	   or	   the	  
Chief	  of	  the	  State	  (dictator,	  president,	  King	  or	  Queen),	  or	  is	  “closely-­‐related”	  to	  a	  top	  
politician.	  The	  data	  sources	  allowed	  to	   identify	  17,033	  politicians	  for	  42	  countries,	  
this	   data	   refers	   to	   politicians	   in	   office	   during	   the	   first	   half	   of	   2001.	   The	   author	  
identified	  a	  number	  of	  variables	  that	  were	  possibly	  associated	  with	  connections	  and	  
used	  two	  variables	  to	  measure	  the	  diffusion	  of	  political	  connections	  at	  the	  country	  
level.	  The	  first,	  “%	  of	  politically	  connected	  listed	  firms”,	  was	  the	  ratio	  of	  connected	  
firms	   over	   the	   total	   number	   of	   firms	   listed	   in	   a	   particular	   country.	   The	   second	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measure,	   “connected	   firms	   as	   %	   of	   market	   capitalization”,	   was	   the	   ratio	   of	   the	  
market	   capitalization	   of	   connected	   firms	   over	   the	   overall	   capitalization	   of	   each	  
country.	   Among	   the	   variables	   that	  were	   probably	   associated	  with	   connections	  we	  
can	  highlight:	  corruption,	  quality	  of	  the	  legal	  environment,	  economic	  development,	  
bureaucracy,	   culture	   (or	   religion,	   Protestants	   as	   fraction	   of	   total	   population),	  
government	   structure	   and	   government	   intervention	   in	   the	   economy.	   In	   the	   paper	  
were	  also	  highlighted	  three	  types	  of	  benefits	  that	  connected	  firms	  enjoy:	  easy	  access	  
to	   debt	   financing,	   tax	   benefits	   and	  market	   power.	   As	   the	  main	   conclusions	   Faccio	  
presented	   that:	   i)	   Connections	   are	   relatively	   widespread,	   out	   of	   a	   sample	   of	   42	  
countries,	  532	  firms	  have	  top	  directors	  or	  large	  shareholders	  who	  sit	  on	  the	  national	  
parliament	  or	  government.	  These	  firms	  represent	  2.68%	  of	  listed	  corporations,	  and	  
7.76%	   of	   the	   world´s	   market	   capitalization;	   ii)	   Connections	   are	   particularly	  
widespread	   in	   countries	  with	   a	   high	   level	   of	   corruption,	   one	   notable	   exception	   to	  
that	  being	  the	  UK;	  iii)	  Connections	  provide	  significant	  benefits	  to	  firms	  in	  terms	  of	  
easier	  access	  to	  debt	  financing,	  lower	  income	  taxation,	  and	  stronger	  market	  power;	  
iv)	  These	  benefits	  are	  generally	  larger	  in	  countries	  where	  connections	  are	  relatively	  
more	   widespread,	   especially	   countries	   with	   high	   corruption,	   low	   protection	   of	  
property	   rights,	   a	   highly	   interventionist	   government,	   or	   a	   non-­‐democratic	  
government;	   v)	  Although	   connections	   provide	   benefits	   to	   corporations,	   connected	  
firms	   exhibit	   significantly	   lower	   performance	   than	   their	   non-­‐connected	  
counterparts.	   Rent-­‐seeking	   by	   politicians	   appointed	   as	   directors	   alone	   cannot	  
explain	  the	  poorer	  returns	  by	  connected	  firms.	  Connected	  firms,	  rather,	  are	  troubled	  
or	   simply	   badly	   managed	   firms.	   The	   underperformance	   of	   connected	   firms	   also	  
raises	   macro-­‐level	   concerns	   as	   to	   distortions	   that	   connections	   introduce	   in	   the	  
allocation	   of	   capital,	   investment	   decisions,	   and	   therefore	   the	   long-­‐term	   growth	   of	  
these	  economies.	  
Other	   cases	   were	   identified	   in	   the	   literature.	   Fisman	   (2001)	   discussed	  
evidence	   from	   Indonesia,	   proving	   that	   firms	   connected	   to	   president	   Suharto	  
suffered	   a	   larger	   impact	  when	   rumors	   of	   his	   illness	  were	   spread	  mid	   1990s	   (the	  
difference	   being	   23%	   as	   compared	   to	   the	   stock	   market).	   The	   same	   evidence	   is	  
apparent	  in	  Malaysia	  in	  the	  1990s,	  considering	  firms	  connected	  to	  the	  circles	  around	  
prime-­‐minister	  Mahathir,	  which	  fell	  20%	  more	  than	  the	  stock	  market	  when	  he	  left	  
power,	  according	   to	   Johnson	  and	  Mitton	  (2003).	  Khwaja	  and	  Mian	  (2005)	   found	  a	  
similar	  case	  for	  Pakistan.	  
Finally,	   a	   detailed	   research	   on	   the	   nomination	   of	   Timothy	   Geithner	   as	  
Secretary	  of	  Treasury	  under	  the	  Obama	  administration	  proved	  that	  the	  firms	  known	  
to	   have	   connections	   with	   the	   banker	   benefitted	   from	   that	   decision	   and	   from	   a	  
significant	  rise	   in	   the	  stock	  market.	  The	  authors	  compare	  that	  process	   to	  previous	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nominations	  and	  argue	  that	  this	  event	  is	  quite	  exceptional	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  it	  is	  due	  to	  
the	  uncertainty	  provoked	  by	  the	  financial	  crisis	  (Acemoglu	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  
	  
3.	  Data	  Description	  
In	  our	  study	  we	  build	  a	  data	  set	  about	  the	  academic	  record	  and	  professional	  career,	  
before	   and	   after	   the	   respective	   terms	   of	   office,	   of	   the	   members	   of	   governments	  
and/or	  the	  governing	  bodies	  of	  central	  banks	  of	  7	  countries.	  We	  have	  a	  panel	  of	  175	  
people:	  80	  members	  of	   the	  governing	  bodies	  of	   central	  banks	  and	  95	  members	  of	  
governments.	  For	  each	  country	  we	  have	  analyzed	  different	  numbers	  of	  members:	  	  
	  













Belgium	   3	   6	   -­‐	   -­‐	   9	  
Brazil	   6	   7	   11	   15	   39	  
France	   3	   3	   16	   18	   40	  
Germany	   6	   6	   -­‐	   -­‐	   12	  
Greece	   3	   9	   -­‐	   -­‐	   12	  
Spain	   1	   10	   21	   14	   46	  
United	  
Kingdom	  
11	   6	   -­‐	   -­‐	   17	  
TOTAL	   33	   47	   48	   47	   175	  
	  
For	   this	  work	  we	  used	  publicly	   available	   information,	  mainly	   the	   curriculum	  vitae	  
published	   in	   the	   official	  websites	   of	   the	   governments	   and	   central	   banks.	   As	   some	  
information	  was	   not	   provided	   by	   the	   institutions	   in	   their	   websites,	   we	   also	   used	  
other	  sources	  with	  information	  about	  the	  career	  of	  the	  analyzed	  members.	  There	  is	  
eventually	  other	  relevant	  information	  we	  could	  not	  notice	  and	  include	  in	  this	  paper.	  
	  
4.	  Results	  
4.1.	   Data	   from	   individuals	   with	   administrative	   functions	   in	   Central	   Banks	  
(1975,	  2015)	  
In	  this	  work	  we	  analyzed	  33	  persons	  in	  1975	  and	  47	  persons	  in	  2015	  from	  Central	  
Banks	  of	  France,	  Spain,	  Greece,	  Belgium,	  United	  Kingdom,	  Brazil	  and	  Germany.	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Obs1:	  For	  some	  persons	  in	  the	  sample,	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  information	  about	  their	  
career	  /education	  and	  therefore	  we	  cannot	  account	  all	  of	  their	  aspects	  according	  to	  
our	  methodology.	  
Obs2:	   Due	   to	   difficult	   access	   to	   information	   on	   Spain	   in	   1975,	   the	   year	   in	  
consideration	  is	  instead	  1976.	  
EDUCATION	  
We	  only	  found	  5	  people	  with	  education	  abroad	  in	  1975	  while	  in	  2015	  we	  found	  15	  
persons.	  In	  1975	  there	  are	  13	  persons	  with	  PhD	  and	  in	  2015	  we	  observe	  15	  persons	  
with	  PhD.	  
CARREER	  
In	  1975,	  there	  are	  5	  persons	  (from	  UK	  and	  Brazil,	  only)	  with	  both	  career	  before	  and	  
career	  after	  their	  function	  in	  Central	  Banks	  in	  firms.	  	  
In	   1975	   we	   observe	   14	   persons	   against	   19	   in	   2015	   that	   made	   career	   only	   in	  
Government,	  Central	  Bank	  or	  other	  public	  institutions.	  	  
In	  1975	  we	  see	  only	  3	  persons	  (from	  UK)	  that	  made	  career	  only	  in	  firms	  before	  and	  
after	   having	   functions	   in	   Central	   Bank.	   In	   2015	   we	   see	   5	   persons	   (from	   Spain,	  
Greece,	  Belgium	  and	  Germany)	  that	  had	  previous	  career	  in	  firms.	  	  
Those	  who	  had	  a	  mixed	  career	  (in	  public	  and	  private	  sectors,	  before	  OR	  after	  their	  
function	   in	   central	   banks)	   in	   1975	   came	   from	   UK	   and	   Brazil	   and	   we	   count	   11	  
persons.	   In	   2015	   we	   see	   8	   persons	   with	   those	   characteristics	   but	   with	   a	   more	  
diverse	  origin	  (from	  all	  countries	  except	  UK	  and	  Germany)	  
Those	   who	   have	   been	   in	   a	   financial	   firm	   administration,	   before	   or	   after	   their	  
position	   in	   Central	   Bank	   in	   1975,	   they	   came	   from	  UK	   and	   Brazil	  mainly,	   but	   also	  
from	  France	   and	  Germany	   and	  we	   count	   10	   persons	   in	   this	   category.	   In	   2015	  we	  
count	  only	  2	  persons,	  from	  Greece	  and	  Belgium.	  
We	  counted	  4	  persons	  in	  1975	  (France,	  Greece,	  Brazil,	  Germany)	  that	  	  were	  part	  of	  
International	  Institutions	  (before	  OR	  after	  having	  functions	  at	  Central	  Bank)	  against	  
10	  persons	  in	  2015	  (from	  all	  countries	  except	  Germany)	  
PROMOTION	  
In	  1975	  we	  observe	  25	  persons	  who	  where	  internally	  promoted	  (i.e,	  that	  came	  from	  
government	  or	  inside	  Central	  Bank	  to	  their	  position	  in	  that	  year)	  against	  18	  persons	  
in	  2015	  (manly	  from	  Spain	  and	  Brazil)	  with	  similar	  characteristics.	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1975	  we	  also	  observe	   that	  are	  11	  persons	   (from	  UK,	  Brazil,	  Germany	  and	  France)	  
that	  were	  externally	  promoted	  (i.e.,	  that	  went	  to	  a	  firm’s	  administration	  after	  their	  
position	  at	  Central	  Bank)	  
	  
4.2.	  Data	  from	  the	  ministers	  in	  post	  in	  the	  Governments	  (1975,	  2015)	  
For	   this	   section,	  we	   analyzed	   27	  ministers	   in	   1975	   and	   47	   persons	   in	   2015	   from	  
Brazil,	  France	  and	  Spain.	  
Obs1:	  For	  some	  persons	  in	  the	  sample,	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  information	  about	  their	  
career	  /education	  and	  therefore	  we	  cannot	  account	  all	  of	  their	  aspects	  according	  to	  
our	  methodology.	  
EDUCATION	  
We	  did	  not	  find	  people	  with	  education	  abroad	  in	  1975	  and	  only	  3	  in	  2015,	  all	  from	  
Brazil	  (PhDs,	  2	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  at	  Chicago	  and	  New	  York,	  and	  1	  in	  France).	  
CAREER	  
In	  1975,	  8	  were	  college	  professors	  and	  9	  had	  a	  law	  degree	  or	  were	  connected	  to	  a	  
law	  office	  before	  having	  functions	  in	  respective	  governments.	  In	  2015,	  the	  numbers	  
to	  consider	  are,	  respectively,	  18	  and	  18.	  
In	   1975,	   all	   French	   individuals	   made	   career	   in	   public	   office	   before	   taking	   their	  
positions	   as	   ministers	   (16).	   In	   Spain,	   only	   one	   didn’t	   made	   career	   in	   the	   public	  
sector	  (19)	  while	  in	  Brazil	  were	  only	  two	  (9).	  Only	  1	  person	  (France)	  made	  career	  in	  
the	  private	  sector	  before	  being	  minister	  and	  2	  made	  it	  both	  in	  Spain	  and	  Brazil.	   In	  
2015,	   everyone	   made	   career	   in	   public	   office	   before	   taking	   their	   positions	   as	  
ministers:	   18	   persons	   in	   France,	   14	   in	   Spain	   and	   15	   in	   Brazil.	   In	   France,	   only	   1	  
person	  made	  career	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  before	  being	  minister,	  while	  5	  persons	  did	  
it	  in	  Spain	  and	  8	  in	  Brazil.	  
Regarding	   the	   career	   after	   the	   government,	   2	   persons	   in	   Spain	   and	   Brazil	   were	  
college	  professors	  but	  none	  had	   the	   same	  position	   in	  France.	  Three	  persons	  were	  
connected	  to	  law	  (members	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Council,	  lawyers,	  notary)	  in	  France	  
and	  Spain	  whereas	  none	  in	  Brazil.	  Only	  one	  had	  no	  public	  office	  in	  France	  after	  being	  
minister	  (15)	  while	  in	  Spain	  and	  Brazil	  we	  counted	  10	  and	  7,	  respectively.	  Note	  that	  
in	  France	  and	  Brazil	  no	  one	  moves	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  while	  in	  Spain	  we	  count	  5	  
people	  doing	  so.	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PROMOTION	  
	  In	  1975,	  we	  observe	  42	  persons	  who	  were	  internally	  promoted	  (i.e.	  that	  came	  from	  
government	  to	  their	  position	  in	  that	  year)	  against	  47	  persons	  in	  2015	  (manly	  from	  
France)	  with	   similar	   characteristics.	  We	   also	   observe	   that	   is	   only	   1	   person	   (from	  
Spain)	  that	  was	  externally	  promoted	  (i.e.,	  that	  went	  to	  a	  firm’s	  administration	  after	  
their	  position	  at	  Government).	  
	  
5.	  Conclusions	  
In	  the	  present	  work	  what	  we	  tried	  to	  test	  for	  the	  “Revolving	  Door	  Theory”,	  analyzing	  
data	  of	  seven	  countries	  -­‐	  Belgium,	  Brazil,	  France,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  Spain	  and	  United	  
Kingdom	  -­‐	  from	  the	  years	  1975	  and	  2015.	  It	   is	  worth	  saying	  that,	  according	  to	  our	  
approach,	  we	  did	  not	  mean	  to	  establish	  a	  causal	  relationship,	  but	  we	  have	  just	  tried	  
to	  identify	  any	  possible	  trends	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  government	  servers	  and	  
private	  firms.	  	  
At	   first	   sight,	   we	   can	   highlight	   that	   the	   sample	   is	   quite	   diverse:	   including	  
European	   and	   non-­‐European	   countries,	   as	   well	   as	   developed	   and	   emerging	  
countries,	   all	   of	   them	   with	   different	   mind-­‐settings	   and	   different	   institutional	  
frameworks,	  along	  with	  different	  socio-­‐cultural	  frameworks.	  
Due	   to	   some	   level	   of	   lack	   of	   information,	  we	  were	   not	   able	   to	  make	  much	  
precise	  statements	  on	  the	  revolving	  door	  hypothesis,	  but	  we	  were	  able	  to	  observe	  a	  
general	   outline	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   government	   members	   and	   the	  
private	  environment.	  In	  the	  following	  lines,	  we	  will	  first	  present	  some	  patterns	  that	  
could	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  data	  for	  Central	  Banks	  and	  Governments	  and	  then	  we	  will	  
relate	  both	  with	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  revolving	  door.	  
5.1.	  Evidence	  from	  the	  Central	  Bank	  members:	  
1)	  	  	  Considerable	   level	   of	   heterogeneity	   in	   the	   academic	   trajectory	   in	   1975;	   central	  
banks´	   boards	   were	   formed	   mainly	   by	   professionals	   educated	   inside	   their	   own	  
countries	  signing	  little	  internationalization	  of	  their	  academic	  trajectories.	  For	  those	  
who	   studied	   abroad,	   we	   were	   not	   able	   to	   observe	   any	   kind	   of	   tendency	   of	  
country/school	  of	  destiny.	  
2)	  	  	  Considerable	  tendency	  for	  internationalization	  in	  terms	  of	  education	  in	  the	  year	  of	  
2015,	  with	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK	  as	  the	  biggest	  host	  countries	  in	  2015.	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3)	  	  	  For	  both	  years,	  2015	  and	  1975,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Central	  Banks	  came	  mainly	  from	  
public	   institutions	   or	   the	   Central	   Bank,	   indicating	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   technocracy	  
inside	  the	  former	  institution.	  
4)	  	  	  Increasing	  number	  of	  ex-­‐members	  of	  international	  institutions	  in	  the	  Central	  Banks’	  
boards.	  
5)	  	  	  The	  pattern	  of	  promotion	  related	  to	  positions	  in	  the	  Central	  Bank´s	  boards	  is	  mainly	  
internal	  in	  both	  years,	  being	  external	  promotions	  observed	  only	  in	  1975.	  
	  
5.2.	  Evidence	  from	  Government	  members:	  
1)	  	  	  A	   few	  members	  of	   the	  1975’s	   governments	  had	  PhDs	   and	   all	   of	   those	  were	   taken	  
inside	  the	  respective	  countries;	  for	  2015,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  members	  of	  the	  
Brazilian	   government	   had	   PhDs	   abroad	   (mainly	   US	   and	   Europe),	   the	   pattern	   is	  
similar	  to	  the	  year	  of	  1975.	  Hence,	  we	  could	  observe	  that	  PhDs	  was	  a	  rare	  attribute	  
for	  governments’	  boards.	  
2)	  	  	  For	  both	  years,	  and	  following	  the	  pattern	  present	  in	  central	  bank´s	  board,	  members	  
of	  the	  government	  came	  mainly	  from	  the	  public	  function.	  	  	  
3)	  	  	  In	  2015,	  however,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  observe	  a	  certain	  tendency	  for	  members	  of	  the	  
Brazilian	   government	   to	   be	   engaged	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   private	   firms	   before	  
their	  mandates;	  as	  the	  only	  emerging	  country	  in	  the	  sample,	  this	  could	  reflect	  some	  
degree	  of	  institutional	  fragility.	  Also,	  for	  Spain,	  one	  fact	  that	  called	  our	  attention	  was	  
that	  many	  members	  of	   the	  Government	  were	  connected	   to	  Law	  Office	  or	  had	  Law	  
degrees	   in	   both	   years,	   being	   the	   board	   of	   the	   government	   constituted	   mainly	   by	  
professionals	  of	  the	  Law	  area.	  
4)	  	  	  In	   terms	   of	   promotions,	   internal	   promotions	   were	   a	   fact	   for	   all	   the	   governments	  
analyzed	  in	  both	  years.	  External	  promotions	  are	  relevant	  just	  for	  the	  year	  of	  2015,	  
being	  Brazil	  the	  country	  that	  presented	  the	  highest	  value.	  
Given	  the	  patterns	  above	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  relate	  the	  conclusions	  we	  reached	  to	  the	  
revolving	  door	   theory.	   The	   reduced	  database	   and	  our	   limitation	   to	   just	   two	   years	  
(1975,	  2015)	  limits	  our	  conclusions.	  However,	  we	  can	  establish	  some	  relationships	  
that	  are	  relevant	   for	  this	  discussion.	  For	   instance,	   the	   fact	   that	  the	  promotions	  are	  
mainly	  done	  internally	  indicates	  that	  the	  movement	  from	  public	  to	  private	  sector	  is	  
much	  more	  intense	  and	  recurrent	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  Furthermore,	  Brazil	  is	  
the	   only	   relevant	   case	   of	  movements	   from	   private	   to	   public	   institutions,	   and	   that	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could	   indicate	   a	   probable	   relationship	   between	   economic	   development	   and	  
institutional	  fragility.	  
Finally,	   we	   should	   highlight	   that,	   from	   the	   evidences	   that	   we	   have,	   it	   is	   only	  
possible	   to	   observe	   isolated	   cases	   of	   connections	   between	   public	   power	   and	   the	  
markets	   –	   as	   the	   high	   correlation	   between	   the	   presence	   in	   law	   offices	   and	   public	  
positions	   in	   Spain	   –	   but	   not	   to	  detect	   a	   general	   and	   consistent	   pattern	  of	   relation	  
between	  the	  respective	  spheres	  of	  powers,	  as	   found	   in	  the	   literature	  we	  surveyed.	  
However,	   and	   as	   we	   previously	   observed,	   the	   lack	   of	   data	   may	   have	   played	   an	  
important	  role	  limiting	  our	  analysis,	  pointing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  future	  similar	  exercises	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